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The year is 2085. Five years ago the Supreme Court overruled Roe
v. Wade.' The Supreme Court has just upheld against constitutional
challenge a federal law that prohibits abortion throughout the coun-
try. The Court's reasoning is that life begins at conception and is pre-
sent throughout pregnancy; and therefore, the federal government
has a compelling interest in protecting that life beginning at concep-
tion.2 Subsequently, the government of Vermont has issued a state-
ment that it will not abide by the Supreme Court's decision and will
use its state national guard to keep abortion clinics open. Its argu-
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410 U.S. 113 (1973). In that case, the Supreme Court constructed a trimester
approach to a state's right to regulate abortion. Id. at 162-64. During the first trimes-
ter, no state interest could overrule the right to have an abortion. Id. During the sec-
ond trimester, only the state's interest in the health of the mother would justify restric-
tions on the right to abortion, so long as those restrictions were rationally related to
her health. Id. Finally, during the third trimester, the state may have an interest in the
fetus itself, and thus may outlaw or restrict abortion. Id.
2 This was exactly Texas's argument in Roe v. Wade. Id. at 159.
3 Vermont's actions would be in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, which holds that, "the Laws of the United States... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI.
(2011)
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ment is that the Constitution created a dualist system of government,4
in which domestic (Vermont) and international (United States) laws
operate with different purposes and constituencies. Essentially, Ver-
mont argues that since the signing of the Constitution, each law of the
United States had to be accepted separately into Vermont law (or, al-
ternatively, not rejected by the Vermont government) before it ac-
quired binding force within the state. While previously it never exer-
cised its right to negate federal law, Vermont argues that it always has
retained the right to invalidate a United States law.
Vermont's argument, indeed entirely hypothetical, seems quite
preposterous. An American state never would disregard a Supreme
Court opinion based on this argument. This state of certainty, how-
ever, does not exist within the European Union. Today, "the courts of
the Member States6 have understandably claimed a voice in determin-
ing the force and effect of Community law in their own domestic legal
orders."7 In Brunner v. European Union Treaty, the German Federal
Constitutional Court went so far as to state that Germany retains its
sovereign right to rescind its membership in the Union at any time.'
The basic argument that is taking place within the European Union,
both in the realm of the courts and the realm of politics, is over the
nature and scope of international law. 9
Whether international law is really law is a question that legal
4 For a description of the dualist approach to international law and the contrast-
ing monist approach, see GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 204-06 (1993) [hereinafter BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW].
5 The Constitution of the United States would not provide a good base upon
which to build for the purposes of this Comment. The Preamble to the Constitution
reads, "We the People of the United States." U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
From these words, one may argue that the people of the United States were party to
the treaty as opposed to the various states. Here, I deal with agreements where sover-
eign states are themselves party to an international treaty. I use this example merely to
show the relevance of the problem.
6 The various nations that are members of the European Union are commonly
referred to as "Member States."
7 BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 4, at 166.
8 [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 61 (BVerfGE 1993) (F.R.G.) ("Germany is one of the
'Masters of the Treaties' with the intention of long-term membership; but it could also
ultimately revoke its adherence by a contrary act.").
9 See, e.g., GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW 125 (Supp. 1998) [hereinafter BERMANN ET AL., SUPPLEMENT] (not-
ing the assumptions that the German constitutional court has made about the nature
of the European Union); The Latest Battle for the Continent's New Shape, ECONOMIST, Dec.
8, 2001, at 47 (discussing the current political debate about the legal nature of the
European Union).
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theorists long have dealt with.' Professor H.L.A. Hart recharacterized
this fundamental question by separating it into two separate inquiries:
(1) How can international law be binding?
1 and (2) Are states fun-
damentally capable of being the subjects of legal obligation?
12 I will
deal strictly with the second of these two issues, for it forces me to
confront an inherent conflict in the concept of international law. If
states are sovereign entities, then they must have complete and total
power. But as soon as one contemplates an international legal struc-
ture, one must contemplate a sovereign state of limited powers."
I will show that this conflict-which on its face seems to prevent
the formation of an international legal structure
4 to coexist with sov-
ereign states-is merely illusory. In doing so, I will provide a frame-
work in which to analyze specific treaties to determine whether or not
they have created an international legal structure that avoids this con-
flict. I will do this by showing that at times sovereign states are not
only permitted, but also are naturally obligated to cede a portion of
their sovereignty, thus becoming subjects of legal obligation and limit-
ing their autonomy.
In order to accomplish this, I expand on the contractarian theory
of Thomas Hobbes.' 5 I use a contractarian theory specifically because
10 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213-37 (2d ed. 1994) (questioning
whether international law could be deemed valid law); Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 291 (1999) (tracing the history of methods of studying international law).
11 See HART, supra note 10, at 216 ("The first [form of doubt] has its roots deep in
the conception of law as fundamentally a matter of orders backed by threats and con-
trasts the character of the rules of international law with those of municipal law.").
This first question Hart posits may be asked of municipal (or non-international) law as
well. See id. at 1-78 (questioning the validity of models of municipal law that are based
on the theory that law is merely a sovereign's coercive orders).
12 See id. at 216 ("The second form of doubt [is] that states are fundamentally in-
capable of being the subjects of legal obligation, and contrasts the character of the sub-
jects of international law with those of municipal law.").
13 This seemingly inherent conflict is accepted by some theories of international
law. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 17 (2d ed. 1979) ("Except as lim-
ited by international law or treaty, a nation is master in its own territory."); Claudio
Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-Centered Transna-
tional Legal Order?, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 1-9 (1993) ("[I]nternational law has
traditionally been concerned with the relations between co-equal sovereign states.").
14 See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (explaining the definition of inter-
national legal structure).
15 My arguments are thus limited to commonwealths formed in contractarian sys-
tems, as the formation of the European Union can be conceptualized. For a brief in-
troduction to the work of Hobbes, see 1 JOHN PLAMENATZ, MAN AND SOCIETY: A
CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SOME IMPORTANT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORIES FROM
2013
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I find that theory the most compelling as to the formation of govern-
ment. I use Hobbes's work because he too identified this fundamen-
tal conflict between autonomous creatures and the formation of a
government. In his writings, however, he dealt with the autonomous
individual and the formation of a sovereign state; he did not deal with
sovereign states and the formation of an international legal structure.
As briefly shown above, the European Union 16 currently provides
the best example of the importance of this issue.17 While the Euro-
pean Union can point to the European Coal and Steel Community as
its origin,"' the institution's structure and scope has tended toward amore centralized international legal structure.' 9 The European Court
MACHIAVELLI TO MARX 116-54 (1963).
16 The European Union is a complex legal structure made up by three "pillars."
BERMANN ET AL., SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, at 3. These pillars are the European
Communities, the system of foreign relations, and the system of domestic security. Id.
The first pillar, the European Communities, is made up of the European Community,
the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity ("Euratom"). Id.; BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw, supra note 4, at 5-
8. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to any part of the structure simply as the Euro-
pean Union.
17 While I will continually use the European Union (or a smaller hypothetical vari-
ant on it) throughout the Comment, my primary goal is to provide a framework for
analyzing the nature of any international treaty. My goal is not simply to solve one is-
sue within the European Union. For example, while it seems quite clear the United
States has the right to withdraw from the ABM treaty, see Treaty on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. XV, 23 U.S.T. 3435, 3446
("Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw
from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of
this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests."), one could use this framework to
anal ze whether the United States has that right with respect to any of its other treaties.
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr. 18
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; see also BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, supra
note 4, at 1-21 (tracing the history of the European Union).
19 See TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND A SINGLE COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (MERGER TREATY), July 13, 1967, 1967 O.J. (L 152) SPEC. ED.
I (establishing a Single Council and single Commission of the European Communi-
ties, as opposed to separate institutions for the European Economic Community, Eura-
tom, and the European Coal and Steel Community); SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, openedfor
signature Feb. 17, 1986, O.J. (L 169) 1 (1987) (authorizing European Union legislation
in environmental protection, occupational safety and health, research and technologi-
cal development, and regional development, as well as giving the European Parliament
a greater role in the legislative process); TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992,
O.J. (C 191) 1 (1992) [hereinafter TEU TREATY] (forming the European Union as it is
currently constituted); TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN
UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN
RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM] (amending the Treaty on European Union and attempting to harmonize
foreign policy and allow freer movement of individuals).
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of Justice, the highest court within the European Union, has at-
tempted to capitalize on the treaty framework" in order to assert its
supremacy over Member State courts. In a decision that Professor
Friedrich Kfibler likens to the European version of Marbury v. Madi-
son,21 the European Court of Justice defined the European Commu-
nity as a "new legal order of international law for the benefit of which
the states have limited their sovereign rights."
22 In response to this
decision and, more importantly, to the growing apprehension of the
loss of autonomy that Member State courts are facing, many Member
State court decisions have reserved the right of their respective states
to opt out of the decisions of the European Court of Justice. For ex-
ample, in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vor-
ratsstelle fir Getreide und Futtermittel,
23 the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court stated that in the case of conflict between European
Union law and German fundamental rights, German fundamental
rights would prevail.24 Italian courts also have reserved their right to
invalidate European Union law if it conflicts with "fundamental prin-
ciples of [the Italian] constitutional order."
2  As mentioned above,
20 The European Economic Community, which is the major pillar of the three pil-
lars establishing the European Union, is based on a series of treaties signed by each of
the countries in the community. See supra note 16 (describing the distillation of the
complex European legal structure into three pillars). See generally BERMANN ET AL.,
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 4, at 22-29 (describing the European Union's
treaty framework). These treaties, taken as a whole, constitute what is known as the
"treaty framework."
21 Friedrich Kfibler, Lecture to His Fall 2001 European Union Law Class at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School (Oct. 18, 2001) (notes on file with author). In
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the case to which Professor Kfibler
refers, the Court held that it had the power to review acts of Congress and declare
them void if found in violation of the Constitution. Id. at 177-78. Analogizing that
case to the European Union, the Court of Justice has asserted that it has the power to
review acts of the Member States and declare them void if found in violation of the
treat% framework or European Union law.
Case 26/62, van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,
1963 E.C.R. 1, 12, [1963] 1 C.M.L.R. 105,129 (1963).
23 [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (BVerfGE 1974) (F.R.G.).
24 The court stated:
[I]n the hypothetical case of a conflict between Community law and.., the
guarantees of fundamental rights in the [German] Constitution, there arises
the question of which system of law takes precedence, that is, ousts the other.
In this conflict of norms, the guarantee of fundamental rights in the Constitu-
tion prevails as long as the competent organs of the Community have not re-
moved the conflict of norms ....
Id. at 551.
25 See Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 372, 389 (Corte cost.
1973) (Italy) (stating that if the EEC were given "an unacceptable power to violate the
2015
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one German court decision even asserts that Germany may opt out of
the European Union at any time.2' An Italian court has also at-
tempted to say, in a decision subsequently overruled by the European
Court ofJustice, that Italy may invalidate European Union Law simply
27by passing subsequent legislation. Thus, to a Member State that
finds itself in the hypothetical situation that the German court pres-
281ents in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, where European Union law
conflicts with fundamental constitutional principles, an argument that
sovereign states can never give away even a portion of their sovereignty
is an extremely powerful one. This argument, which Professor Hart
defines as the "auto-limitation" theory,29 is a logical conclusion if one
were to accept the conflict described above"" as a truism. Under the
auto-limitation theory, "a state's agreements or treaty engagements
are treated as mere declarations of its proposed future conduct, and
failure to perform is not considered to be a breach of any obliga-
tion. '"
Under the framework with which I propose to analyze interna-
tional treaties, the auto-limitation theory fails because at times, treaty
engagements in fact create binding obligations upon contracting
states. Thus, the framework I suggest eliminates the possible conflict
between Member State and European Union courts, and eliminates
the viability of the reservationist language that various Member State
courts have included in their decisions concerning controversial
European Union Law.
Specifically, the framework I propose will thwart the argument
that the Irish Supreme Court makes in Society for the Protection of Unborn
32Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan. In that case, student unions and
their officers published student handbooks with the names and ad-
dresses of abortion clinics in the United Kingdom. They did so even
though article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution protects the right to life
fundamental principles of [the Italian] constitutional order... [the Italian constitu-
tional court] would control the continuing compatability of the Treaty with the above-
mentioned fundamental principles").
26 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court's holding in Brunner v. European Union Treaty).
27 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, [1964] 1 C.M.L.R. 425 (1964).
28 The hypothetical case is spelled out supra note 24.
29 HART, supra note 10, at 224.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text (describing the potential conflict).
31 HART, supra note 10, at 224.
32 [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 689 (Ir. S.C. 1989).
33 Id. at 692.
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of unborn children and prohibits abortions.
34 The plaintiffs sought a
permanent injunction prohibiting the publication of these hand-
books,"5 but the defendants argued that an injunction would violate
the European Union's guarantee of free movement of services.
36 The
Irish High Court sent a preliminary reference, the European Union
version of certification, to the European Court of Justice asking for
resolution of the issue. The Irish Supreme Court, however, decided
that the right to life was a constitutionally protected right in Ireland
and the application for the injunction was meant to restrain an un-
constitutional activity.
39 As to whether this violated a European Union
right, the court stated:
If and when a decision of the European Court of justice rules that
some aspect of European Community law affects the activities of the de-
fendants. .. the consequence of that decision on these constitutionally
guaranteed rights and their 4rotection by the Courts will then fall to be
considered by these 
Courts.
This statement challenges the authority of the European Court of
Justice. It asserts the ability of the Irish Supreme Court to review and
rule on a matter already decided by the European Court of Justice. I
will prove this statement incorrect.
B. The Structure of the Argument
Under the auto-limitation theory, which stems from the conflict
between autonomous sovereigns and an international legal structure,
it is never permissible for sovereigns to cede any portion of their
34 IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3.
35 See Unborn Children, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. at 697 (noting the plaintiff's reliance on
article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution).
36 See id. at 697-98 (reporting the defendants' argument that the constitutional
right was qualified by a right flowing from European Community Law).
37 Authorized by article 234 (article 177 under the old numbering) of the Treaty,
the preliminary reference mechanism at times allows, and at other times requires, that
a Member State court send an issue to the European Court of Justice for a ruling on
the Community Law aspect of a particular case. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 234, O.J. (C 340) 2 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
38 See Unborn Children, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. at 695 (noting the lower court's opinion
that the preliminary ruling was necessary under the Treaty Establishing the European
Community). While the reference was pending in the European Court of Justice, the
plaintiffs appealed the decision to obtain a preliminary reference to the highest court
in Ireland, the Irish Supreme Court. BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW,
supra note 4, at 233-34.
39 Unborn Children, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. at 698-99.
40 Id. at 699.
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41authority. I will show that at times, sovereign states are obligated to
cede portions of their authority. Accordingly, an auto-limitation the-
ory is inherently contradictory to a theory of international relations. A
sovereign cannot have both an obligation to take an action and an ob-
ligation not to take that action.4 1 If the auto-limitation theory is false
and states are at times obligated to create an international sovereign,
it follows that they would be obliged to obey this newly created sover-
eign.
The process of showing that sovereigns are at times obligated to
cede portions of their authority involves three steps. In Part I, I build
a foundational understanding of the Hobbesian text.4" In this Part, I
will argue that Hobbes's theory allows for the initial covenant to limit
44the authority of the sovereign. Accordingly, it will be necessary to
explore the theory of authorization, which is central to the institution
of the sovereign. In order to show why a sovereign may be required to
41 One may argue that a ceding of authority is perfectly acceptable under an auto-
limitation theory. On this argument, a ceding of authority would not be permanent-
it would simply be a prudential act that could be nullified. See E-mail from William
Ewald, Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, to Eric Wilensky
(Mar. 19, 2002, 21:39:26 EST) (on file with author) ("A classical Hobbesian ... would
agree that a sovereign can enter into a treaty or a customary practice, and for pruden-
tial reasons keep its promises-but without thereby surrendering any of its ultimate
sovereignty, and without creating a new, super-sovereign."). For purposes of this
Comment, a "ceding of authority" implies permanence-it is synonymous with a ced-
ing of sovereignty. As such, it is incompatible with an auto-limitation theory.
42 The subject of contradictory obligations is being debated currently within the
realm of moral and legal philosophy. See generally Symposium, Conflicts of Rights, 7
LEGAL THEORY 235 (2001) (presenting various solutions to the rights-conflict issue).
Contemporary rights theorists generally have assumed that rights (and by implication,
accompanying obligations) cannot conflict. See Claire Oakes Finkelstein, Introduction to
the Symposium on Conflicts of Rights, 7 LEGAL THEORY 235, 235 (2001) ("There is ... a
perfectly good explanation for why [the issue of conflicting rights] has received so lit-
tle attention; namely that contemporary rights theorists have generally assumed that
rights cannot conflict."). Those who believe rights may conflict offer many solutions to
the problem. See, e.g., Claire Oakes Finkelstein, Two Men and a Plank, 7 LEGAL THEORY
279, 288-306 (2001) (rejecting the assumption that if A has a right to X, then she can-
not also have a duty to refrain from X); Philip Montague, When Rights Conflict, 7 LEGAL
THEORY 257, 277 (2001) (arguing that rights may conflict at a prima facie level, but
these conflicts may be resolved on an all-things-considered level). I believe in the
rights-specification theory, which does not allow for conflicting rights and obligations.
However, a discussion of rights-conflict theory is outside the scope of this Comment
and as such, for the purposes of this Comment, I must leave this statement as an as-
sum Vton.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text (outlining the reasons for using Hob-
bes's theory).
44 By initial covenant, I am referring to the covenant creating the municipal sover-
eigu.
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cede some of its authority, I will also discuss Hobbes's theory of obli-
gation and his idea of a natural limit to the life of the sovereign.
Having laid down this framework, in Part II, I will turn to the rela-
tionships that the commonwealths5 have with each other. From this
description, and the previously laid foundation, I will present a pre-
liminary version of "The Fundamental Law of International Rela-
tions.""' This is the law that imposes upon the municipal sovereign (or
sovereign of a nation-state) an obligation to create an international
sovereign (or international governing body) at certain times.
47 This is
a law of international relations, which allows us to show that treaty ob-
ligations that create international sovereigns are valid transfers of sov-
ereign authority, and thus create a binding obligation on the munici-
pal sovereign to obey the international sovereign.
Finally, in Part III, I answer potential objections to this theory. In
this Part, I have two goals. First, I ensure that there are no internal
inconsistencies with my use of the Hobbesian framework. Second,
and more importantly, I argue that any potential objections cannot be
supported by the Hobbesian text, but instead represent merely intui-
tive arguments against my theory. An analysis of these objections ul-
timately leads to a stronger theory of international relations, for it re-
quires three corollaries to my original thesis: (1) the powers granted
by the municipal sovereign to the international sovereign cannot ex-
ceed the powers granted the municipal sovereign by its subjects; (2)
an international legal structure cannot be created if municipal states
already have fallen back into the Hobbesian state of nature with re-
spect to each other; and (3) the municipal sovereign must have the
legal authority within its own nation's framework to enter into inter-
national treaties.
While my definition of "international sovereign" will become
clearer throughout the Comment, it is important to make a prelimi-
nary note. By international sovereign, I do not mean "king of the
481
world." The international sovereign is not the Leviathan. Rather, it
45 For purposes of this Comment, I shall use the terms "commonwealth" and "sov-
ereign state" interchangeably.
This law, while based upon the Hobbesian text, is of my own invention and is
not itself located within the text. See infra note 74 (noting that my theory is a "quasi-
Hobbesian," not a strict Hobbesian theory.
47 See infra note 48-49 and accompanying text (explaining the meaning of interna-
tional sovereign).
48 Leviathan was a large, terrifying marine animal. See Job 41:1 (describing the Le-
viathan). In one edition of Hobbes's Leviathan, the sovereign is illustrated as a Levia-
than subsuming its subjects. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 71 (C.B. MacPherson ed.,
2019
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is an international legal structure to which various commonwealths
have ceded some of their sovereignty. 49 As I will show, this structure
can be extremely limited in scope, and indeed oftentimes must be.
I. BUILDING THE ANALYrICAL FRAMEWORK
A. A Review of the Hobbesian State of Nature and an
Introduction to the Hobbesian Sovereign
Hobbes writes that in the state of nature, every man has a right to
everything. 50 But the meaning of "right to everything" must be clari-
fied. For if every man had a right to everything, surely all rights would
be cancelled out and no man would have a right to anything. A better
way of understanding what Hobbes was saying may be to assert that in
the state of nature, all men have a privilege to everything.
Professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's rights analysis will help ex-
plain this.52 Professor Hohfeld presents his readers with four correla-
tive relations.3 These are right-duty, privilege-no right, power-liability
and immunity-disability. 54 Rights, for which Hohfeld uses the synonym
claims, are rights precisely because they contain correlative duties to
do or refrain from doing something. In a Hohfeldian system, a claim
Penguin Books 1968) (1651).
The European Union stands as an example of this international legal structure.
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, ch. xiv, para. 4 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett
Publ'g Co. 1994) (1651) ("[I]n such a condition [as exists in the state of nature] every
man has a right to everything, even to one another's body.").
In her book, Judith Jarvis Thomson also notes that a way to understand this por-
tion of the Hobbesian text is to assert that all men have a privilege to everything. See
JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 50 (1990) ("There is no difficulty
whatever if the natural rights one has in mind are, all of them, privileges."). However,
Thomson goes on to declare that a privilege is simply a lesser form of a right. Id. at 50-
52. I think it better, for purposes of this Comment at least, to stay with the Hohfeldian
categories as strictly delimitating rights from privileges. See infta text accompanying
notes 52-61 (discussing Hohfeld's distinction between rights and privileges).
52 Professor Hohfeld intended his categories to be utilized to provide a framework
for analyzing basic conceptions of law. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamen-
tal Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) ("[T]he pre-
sent article ... will discuss as of chief concern, the basic conceptions of the law,-the
legal elements that enter into all types of jural interests."), reprinted in WESLEY
NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 23 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923) [hereinaf-
ter HOHFELD, CONCEPTIONS].
53 Id. at 36.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 38. For a theory of what it means to be under a duty, and hence what it
means to have a claim, see THOMSON, supra note 51, at 61-78.
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in person A as to person B to X necessarily implies that person B has a
duty to person A to X16 So in the state of nature, if all people had
claims to all things, then all people would be under a duty to refrain
from all things, and thus no man would have a claim to anything be-
cause he would have a duty to refrain by virtue of the claims held by
others." A privilege, on the other hand, implies a lack of a duty."8 A
lack of duty in person A as to person B to X implies a lack of claim of
person B as to person A to X. This lack of claim Hohfeld terms a no-
right.9 Applying this terminology to the Hobbesian state of nature,
humans have a privilege as to everyone to everything and no person
has a claim to anyone for anything. As such, each person has a no-right
to everyone as to everything, which means that all the world is open to
all persons, with the only question being who has the physical and
mental ability to control a thing. This no-right in everyone is equiva-
lent to what Hobbes deems to be the "liberty" of all people in the state
of nature.6° Following this, what Hobbes deems to be the "right of na-
ture" is the privilege to do anything that would preserve one's own
life, using any means to do so."'
Since each person has a no-right to everyone as to everything,
Hobbes's state of nature can be a harrowing place. No one has a
claim against any other person, even for the protection of his or her
own body. Hobbes calls this state of insecurity a state of war. It is im-
portant to note that a state of war in Hobbesian terms does not neces-
sarily imply battle, but rather a state of insecurity."'
Under Hobbes's theory, humans, using their reasoning, 63 quickly
realize that the state of nature is not advantageous. From this, hu-
mans deduce the fundamental laws of nature to which all humans are
bound.6 Among other things, these laws oblige humans to seek peace
56 HOHFELD, CONCEPTIONS, supra note 52, at 37-38.
57 See supra note 42 for a caveat as to the rejection of competing claims.
58 HOHFELD, CONCEPTIONS, supra note 52, at 38-39.
59 Id. at 39-41.
60 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiv, para. 2. Indeed, Hohfeld states, without ref-
erence to Hobbes, that the closest synonym of legal "privilege" is legal "liberty."
HOHFELD, CONCEPTIONS, supra note 52, at 47.
61 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiv, para. 1.
62 See id. at ch. xiii, para. 8 ("[Sbo the nature of war consisteth not in actual fight-
ing, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to
the contrary.").
63 See HOBBES, supra note 50, at chs. i-xi (discussing the state of man and man's
reasoning abilities).
For a description of why humans are bound by the law of nature, see DAVID P.
GAUTHIER, LOGIC OF LEVIATHAN: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF THOMAS
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if they have hope of obtaining it (and when they cannot to use all
helps and advantages of war), and if necessary to that end and so long
as others are willing to do so, to lay down their rights to all things. 5
Essentially, these laws tell humans that for their advantage, they
should seek peace, and that the best way to do so is to lay down parts
of their natural liberty. From these laws of nature, people find that
the best way to ensure their security is to enter into a commonwealth.
Hobbes describes entering into the commonwealth as follows:
The only way to erect such a common power. . . is [for men] ... to
appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person, and every one
to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so
beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted . . . and therein to
submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments, to his
judgment.66
Here Hobbes is dictating that in laying down parts of their natural
liberty with respect to each other, people ought to create a common
power that can ensure peace. It is extremely important to note that
the agreement to create the commonwealth is an agreement among
the subjects exclusively. "A commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a
multitude of men do agree and covenant, every one with every one...." 67
The sovereign is not party to the covenant that creates the political
commonwealth. Rather, the sovereign can be viewed as a third-party
beneficiary to this social contract."8
HOBBES 35-40 (1969). While an extended discussion of why humans are bound by
these laws of nature is outside the scope of this Comment, the Hobbesian text con-
cisely states that the "LAW determineth and bindeth." HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch.
xiv, .ara. 3.
And consequently it is a precept, or general rule, of reason that every man
ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it, and when he
cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war.
The first branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of na-
ture, which is to seek peace, and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of
nature, which is by all means we can, to defend ourselves.
From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to en-
deavour peace, is derived this second law: that a man be willing, when others
are so too, as far-forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it
necessary, to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much
liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.
HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiv, paras. 4-5 (emphasis and footnote omitted). For a
discussion of the laws of nature, see PLAMENATZ, supra note 15, at 179-90; HOWARD
WARRENDER, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES 48-79 (1957).
HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xvii, para. 13.
CA Id. at ch. xviii, para. 1.
Claire Finkelstein, Hobbes on Contract 40 (Sept. 2, 2000) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author) ("[T]he Social Covenant looks suspiciously like a third-party
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The characteristics of the sovereign created out of this covenant
are similar to that of natural humans. Hobbes states:
A person is he whose words or actions are considered either as his own, or as
representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing to whom
they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction.
When they are considered as his own, then is he called a natural per-
son; and when they are considered as representing the words and actions
of another, then is he a feigned or artificial person.
Thus, the sovereign is considered an artificial person, and the fact
that its actions represent the actions of others is all that differentiates
it as an artificial person from natural entities. A conclusion from the
fact that this is the only inherent difference between artificial and
natural entities is that artificial persons are subject to the laws of na-
ture and can be describedjust as Hobbes describes natural humans.
There is, however, another difference between the sovereign and
natural men. This difference arises from the covenant between the
subjects, rather than the internal characteristics of the sovereign. As
David P. Gauthier states, "[s] overeign right is not merely the right to
rule over other men. Every man [including artificial men] has this
right by nature."0 What sets the characteristics of the sovereign apart
from that of natural humans, Gauthier states, is the correlative obliga-
tion of the subjects." This correlative obligation is an obligation to
obey the sovereign, thus giving it power over its subjects.
7
1
Initially, one may believe that the most important characteristic of
the sovereign is its absolute power. Read simply, the text states that the
subjects shall authorize all the actions and judgments of the sover-
eign. 3 Hobbes's theory, however, does allow for a limitation of the
74
sovereign's seemingly absolute powers.
beneficiary contract: it is an agreement made among the citizens pertaining to the
sovereign, of which the sovereign is not himself a member.").
6. HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xvi, paras. 1-2.
70 GAUTHIER, supra note 64, at 99 (citations omitted).
71 See id. at 100 ("For there can be no sovereign without subjects, and no subjects
without obligation to obey.").
72 See infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text (explaining in detail how the sover-
eign's power over its subjects is created).
73 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xviii, para. 1.
74 This assertion represents a tremendous departure from Hobbes's own intent. See
GAUTHIER, supra note 64, at 133-39 (examining Hobbes's insistence upon an absolute
sovereign). Nevertheless, while Hobbes's insistence upon an absolute sovereign is
quite apparent, see HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xxix, para. 1 (stating that "want of ab-
solute power" tends toward the dissolution of a commonwealth), I believe, and Gauth-
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.B. The Sovereign's Power and the Limitation of Those Powers
Hohfeld's theory supports the idea that a sovereign of limited
powers can be created. Recall that I have argued that in the state of
nature, people have global privileges and correlative no-rights, but
they do not have claims and correlative duties." In entering the com-
monwealth and covenanting with each other, however, all persons
take on a certain duty and correlative claim. Imagine, for purposes of
simplicity, a Europe consisting solely of Germany, France, and Italy. 6
In creating a "European Union,"" the sovereign of Germany now has
a duty7 8 to the sovereign of France to obey the sovereign of the Euro-
pean Union.79 Germany also has a separate duty to Italy to obey the
European Union. Similarly, Italy has a claim against Germany that
Germany obey the European Union. Italy and France are substituted
with Germany, and, eventually, each Member State8 ° has two claims
ier writes, that a formal inquiry into Hobbes's work will lead to a conclusion that "[t]he
extent of the authorization granted to the sovereign determines the extent of sover-
eign right." GAUTHIER, supra note 64, at 133. This ability to limit the sovereign's pow-
ers will play a large role not only in defending my thesis, but also in adding a corollary
to my theory of international relations. Further, it will serve to prevent the conclusion
that an international sovereign must be a "king of the world."
Nevertheless, one must be careful not to equate my theory with one that Thomas
Hobbes himself would endorse. Rather, I put forth a "quasi-Hobbesian" theory-one
that I believe may be deduced from the Hobbesian text, even if Hobbes himself did
not foresee it, and to which he would not subscribe. See E-mail from William Ewald,
Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, to Eric Wilensky (Mar. 19,
2002, 21:39:26 EST) (on file with author) ("[Thomas Hobbes] himself holds... to...
a theory of indivisible sovereignty; it's not clear that he'd agree that, if a member state
cedes some of its sovereignty to the EU, it then remains (stricto sensu) a Hobbesian
sovereign.").
75 Supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
76 At this point in the Comment, I have not yet established that sovereigns can act
as "men" and themselves enter into a Hobbesian contract with each other. As such,
either accept as an assumption that they can, or view Germany, France, and Italy as the
only three people in Europe and the sovereign they create known as the "European
Union."
77 I use the term "European Union" in order to help conceptualize my argument.
I do not use it to refer to the true "European Union."
78 Though this covenant was made in the state of nature, it is still a valid covenant.
See infra notes 95-96 (noting that the notion that covenants may create obligations in
the state of nature is a contentious one, and referencing Warrender's theory on how
this may be possible).
79 While it is important to note that it is the sovereign engaging in these relation-
ships, for linguistic ease I will refer to the "sovereign of Germany" simply as "Ger-
many." I will regard similarly France, Italy, and the European Union. If, as per foot-
note 76, one is assuming Germany, France, and Italy are individual actors, they may be
considered their own sovereigns.
8o The term Member State is the European Union equivalent for the term "subject
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and two duties. Note that the Member States do not have a distinct
duty to the European Union to obey it; rather they have a duty toward
each other to obey the European Union."' The question becomes
how the European Union's power comes about if the covenant merely
creates rights and duties between the Member States.
Hohfeld's third and fourth categories are power-liability and im-
munity-disability. 82 A power is best described as the ability to change
the legal status of another.83 A liability exists when your legal status
84
may be changed by another's use of his power. To the contrary, a
legal immunity is the freedom from the power of another.85 In other
words, to hold an immunity from A as to X means that you are not sub-
ject to a change in legal status in relation to X by A. However, if you
hold a legal liability under A as to X, then you are subject to a change
in legal status by A with regard to X Thus, by obligating themselves to
obey anything the sovereign does, the subjects now have a legal liabil-
ity toward the sovereign and the sovereign has the power to change
their legal status. The sovereign is the only entity within this union
holding this power.
To make the point, we return to the three-member European Un-
ion. France says to Italy, "I covenant with you that I shall obey the
European Union." It is what comes at the end of the sentence that
determines the scope of the European Union's powers. If France
states, "I covenant with you that I shall obey the European Union, re-
nounce all my privileges that I previously had, will have further claims
and privileges only as the European Union recognizes, and will give it
unlimited powers," then the European Union is absolute and has the
power to do anything as per France. France thus has a liability as to
the European Union concerning every dynamic of its existence.s6 The
of the European Union." See supra note 6 (defining "Member State" as the various
members of the European Union).
See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting that the covenant creating the
sovereign is taken up between the various subjects of the sovereign, and not between
the subjects and the sovereign itself).




86 It should be noted here that in Hobbesian theory, one cannot renounce one's
privilege to self-defense. HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiv, para. 29. Thus, while in
general subjects' liabilities are coupled with a duty to other subjects to obey the sover-
eign, under the Hobbesian view, in the case of a punishment, the subject is relieved of
his duty to obey and may try to escape sentence. For a fascinating discussion of Hob-
bes's argument for the ight of self-defense in the state of civil society, see Claire
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European Union's power comes about because, as an artificial man, it
has a privilege to all things,"' whereas France has conditioned its privi-
lege to all things on the will of the sovereign.
With a different ending to the sentence, however, it is possible to
create a sovereign with only limited powers. Germany may say to
France, "I covenant with you that I shall obey the European Union
and renounce my privileges and confer upon it powers regarding
criminal law." The European Union's powers are then limited to
criminal law. As to civil law, administrative law, etc., the sovereign
does not have the power to limit the privileges of the Member States.
Some may argue that this is a misconception. After all, the sover-
eign is merely a collection of all the citizens of the commonwealth,
who themselves have a privilege as to everything. The sovereign, thus,
by its very nature, has a privilege as to everything that cannot be lim-
ited. The subjects, however, are not creating privileges in the sover-
eign when they covenant with each other. Rather, they are creating
powers-the ability to change legal status. By taking upon themselves
not just a duty, but the specific duty to obey the sovereign, the subjects
give the sovereign the power to change their legal status."
Returning to the European Union example, Italy says to Germany,
"I covenant with you that I shall obey the European Union, renounce
my privileges, and confer upon it powers regarding economics."
Though the European Union may, by virtue of the sovereign as an ar-
tificial person, have a privilege to all things (including economics,
crime, pollution, etc.), it only has powers with regard to economics.
The existence of a power and immunity on the part of the sovereign,
and a liability and disability on the part of the subject, are the defining
characteristics of the sovereign."9
In limiting the privileges they agree to lay down, the subjects can
limit the power of the sovereign. This does not contradict Hobbes's
theory; it is merely an extension of it. Hobbes says: "[W]hen [his sub-
jects] limit [the sovereign] in what, and how far, he shall represent
them, none of them owheth more than they gave him commission to
Finkelstein, A Puzzle About Hobbes on Self-Defense, 82 PAC. PHIL. Q. 332 (2001).
87 See supra note 69 and accompanying text (noting that the artificial man is simi-
lar to the natural man, including the characteristic of having privileges to all things).
88 See GAUTHIER, supra note 64, at 99-100 (elaborating on the meaning of sover-
eign right and sovereign power).
Alternatively, one may view a power as a liberty in the sovereign that none of its
subjects has. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (describing Hohfeld's rights
analysis and elaborating on the meaning of the term "liberty").
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act." 90 As such, with the exception of imposing a punishment upon its
subjects,"' a sovereign has power over all its subjects to the extent of
the power granted to it by the initial covenant. The scope of the sov-
ereign's powers and immunities depends on the covenant between
citizens. While I have not disproved the auto-limitation theory yet, if
international law is valid, then it is clear that Ireland, in Society for the
Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,2 had a duty to the
other Member States to obey the Court of Justice, where the matter
was properly within the jurisdiction of the court:
C. The Ends of Government and the Natural Limit to the Sovereign's Power
The final building block to the Fundamental Law of International
Relations is an analysis of the theory of obligation within the state of
nature. This theory of obligation will lead toward the natural limit to
the sovereign's power.
There is no justice or injustice in the state of nature.94 Given this,
it is questionable whether there may be obligation in such a state,9 5
but I believe there may be and as such, will discuss Hobbes's theory. of
obligation as if it applies both in the state of nature and in a munici-
pal commonwealth.9
90 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xvi, para. 14.
91 See supra note 86 and accompanying text (noting the Hobbesian caveat to sub-
ject's obligations to their sovereigns).
92 See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text (discussing the Unborn Children
case).
The free movement of services that is at issue in this case is within the court's
jurisdiction. See TREAIY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 19, at art. 49 ("[R]estrictions on
freedom to provide services within the Community shall be prohibited. ... ").
94 See HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiii, para. 13 ("To this war of every man against
every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right
and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common
power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice.").
,95 This, in fact, is considered a fundamental flaw in Hobbes's theory, for if there is
no obligation, there can be no covenant and thus the original covenant creating the
sovereign cannot be made. See GAUTHIER, supra note 64, at 59 ("Hobbes supposes that
we escape from the state of nature, and enter political society, by covenant, but he can
be interpreted as holding that covenants made in the state of nature are invalid.);
PLAMENATZ, supra note 15, at 190-197 (discussing the making and keeping of cove-
nants, specifically the initial covenant); WARRENDER, supra note 65, at 1-9 (discussing
the questions left open in Hobbes's theory of obligation). Many theorists have at-
tempted to reconcile this problem with the Hobbesian text. See GAUTHIER, supra note
64, at 58-60 (demonstrating how obligation may exist in the state of nature);
WARRENDER, supra note 65, at 30-100 (discussing obligation in the state of nature).
N While an extended discussion of Hobbes's theory of obligation is outside the
scope of this Comment, I will accept as an assumption that obligation may exist in the
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Hobbes says of obligations:
Right is laid aside either by simply renouncing it or by transferring it
to another .... And when a man hath in either manner abandoned or
granted away his right, then is he said to be Obliged or Bound not to
hinder those to whom such right is granted or abandoned from the
benefit of it; and.., he ou ht, and it is his Duty, not to make void that
voluntary act of his own ....
Returning to the Hohfeldian categories, at least one claim and one
duty will be created in a covenant.9s Hobbes considers fulfilling that
duty to be an obligation. 9  Germany says to Italy, "I will give you
twenty dollars now, if you promise to give me twenty bottles of wine
within two weeks," and Italy agrees. Once Germany gives Italy twenty
dollars, Italy has a duty to Germany and is under an obligation to ful-
fill that duty. °°
Only certain covenants are valid initially in the Hobbesian
scheme' 0 1-and, in general, for those covenants to end there must be
state of nature, will base this assumption on Warrender's theory, and will utilize his
framework.
97 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiv, para. 7 (emphasis and citations omitted).
98 A covenant is an agreement by which rights are mutually transferred, but one,
or both, of the parties to the agreement performs his part at a later time. See HOBBES,
supra note 50, at ch. xiv, para. 11 ("Again, one of the contractors may deliver the thing
contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate
time after... and then the contract on his part is called a... Covenant .... (empha-
sis omitted)).
99 See id. at ch. xiv, para. 7 ("And when a man hath ... abandoned his rights...
then he is said to be obliged.., and it is his duty, not to make void that voluntary act
of his own .... " (emphasis omitted)). Note that Hobbes makes a distinction between
obligations in foro interno (those obligations that do not come from an external legal
source) and in foro externo (those that do). Id. at ch. xv, para. 36. The breaking of
obligations in foro interno is a vice, but not necessarily a crime. HOBBES, supra note 50
at ch. 15, paras. 35-37. Nevertheless, since in foro interno and in foro externo obliga-
tions are both subspecies of obligations, those under either type of obligation must see
that it is undertaken. HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiv, para. 7.
100 This would be true both in the state of nature and in a civil society. See
HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xv, paras. 36-41 (noting that laws of nature and laws of
civil society oblige the same result); see also WARRENDER, supra note 65, at 53-79 (ex-
plaining how obligations in the state of nature, though subject to the satisfaction of
validating conditions, are not unlike the obligations of civil society). Even if the cove-
nant were made in the state of nature, Italy would be bound in foro interno by the laws
of nature to fulfill its covenant.
101 See HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiv, paras. 9-33 (giving a framework for the
evaluation of when a covenant is valid).
A covenant is valid at the time when it is made, if it is a covenant to do
something permitted by law, and if both parties have accepted it, and further,
if it is not a covenant to do something known to be impossible, nor one re-
signing the right of self-defence, nor stipulating obligations to a person un-
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either performance or forgiveness. 10 2 There are certain ways, however,
that covenants are invalidated, without either performance or forgive-
ness. A properly created covenant can be invalidated if the requisite
condition of mutual trust degenerates:
If a covenant be made wherein neither of the parties perform pres-
ently, but trust one another, in the condition of mere nature.., upon
any reasonable suspicion it is void; but if there be a common power set
over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance,
it is not void.
The cause of fear which maketh such a covenant invalid must be al-
ways something arising after the covenant made (as some new fact or
other sign of the will not to perform), else it cannot make the covenant
void. For that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought notS 103
to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.
Thus if one party to the covenant reasonably suspects that a sec-
ond party will not fulfill its obligations under the covenant, then the
covenant becomes void. For example, in our Hobbesian state-of-
nature Europe, France and Italy have just covenanted between them-
selves. France agreed to dispose of Italy's garbage for the next month,
and in exchange Italy agreed to supply France with wine. Both France
and Italy now have a claim against each other and a duty to each
other. However, something may happen such that Italy no longer
trusts that France will dispose of its trash and fears that France instead
will stop disposal after one week. 10 4 Since Italy reasonably (as judged
by Italy) suspects that France will not complete its obligations under
the covenant, the covenant is void. Since the covenant would have
disappeared, Italy then may stop providing wine to France without vio-
lating its obligation.
In the state of nature, this happens quite frequently. Since each
human is the judge of his or her own opinion, 10 5 most people likely
would consider their suspicions to be reasonable, and covenants ac-
known to the party obliged, nor, finally, a covenant to give or do something,
the right to which has previously been covenanted away.
WARRENDER, supra note 65, at 35.
102 See HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiv, para. 26 ("Men are freed of their cove-
nants two ways; by performing or by being forgiven.").
10 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiv, paras. 18, 20.
104 Whatever it was that made Italy suspicious of France must be a condition that
arose after the creation of the covenant.
105 See HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiv, para. 18 ("[I]n the condition of mere na-
ture ... all men are equal andjudges of thejustness of their own fears .....
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cordingly would be voided. In civil society, however, this cannot hap-
pen. Consider again our European Union of Italy, France, and Ger-
many. Since this European Union now controls the sword, and now
can enforce all of the Member State's covenants, a fear that one
Member State will not perform its covenant is unreasonable.' 06 Thus it
seems that covenants of mutual trust cannot be made invalid as long
as the sovereign exists.
There is, however, a particular covenant that may be invalidated in
civil society under certain circumstances. That covenant is the origi-
nal covenant that created the commonwealth. Hobbes says of the end
of commonwealths, "the end of this institution is the peace and de-
fence of them all. "' °7 If the commonwealth stops providing the peace
and defense of the subjects so that the subjectsjustly suspect that their
fellow subjects will stop performing their obligations under the origi-
nal covenant, the commonwealth comes to an end. 1
s
One may argue that this seems contrary to Hobbes's ideas. Hob-
bes seems to say that no one may challenge the power of the sover-
eign. °9 However, the covenant that created the sovereign, which is
the basis of the sovereign's power, is a covenant between the subjects
of the commonwealth."0 The sovereign is not a party to the cove-
106 See HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiv, para. 19 ("But in a civil estate, where there
is a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is
no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform first is
obliged to do so.").
07 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xviii, para. 8.
108 Howard Warrender explains:
The subject may . . . legitimately ask whether the sovereign has in fact the
power to protect him ....
... [Tihe subject is entitled to act upon suspicion, or in prevention of dan-
ger provided that he sincerely considers his fears for his life to be reasonable.
.. [T]he civil law provides no protection from the sovereign's lack of power
• . . [If the citizen should claim exemption from (an] obligation on the
ground that he suspects that the sovereign has not the power to enforce the
agreement and then on the ground that his fellow citizen is not to be relied
upon, it would appear that Hobbes would have to concede such a claim ....
WARRENDER, supra note 65, at 116-17.
109 See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xviii, paras. 4-20 (discussing the superior-
ity of proclamations of the sovereign and their immunity to challenge by the subject).
But see id. at ch. xxi, para. 21 ("The obligations of subjects to the sovereign is under-
stood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to pro-
tect them.").
11 See supra Part I.B (explaining how subjects create the covenant that empowers
or constrains the sovereign).
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nant.'1 The duties and claims that exist regarding obedience to the
laws of the sovereign are in relation to the subjects. For example, the
sovereign of the now-troubled European Union has become lethargic.
Germany suspects that France no longer will obey the European Un-
ion. Further, it suspects the European Union no longer will compel
France to obey. As long as its suspicions are reasonable,'1 2 Germany's
duty to the Member States to obey the European Union is extin-
guished. Accordingly, Germany now may no longer respect the Euro-
pean Union's authority without violating its duty owed toward the
other Member States.
Accordingly, all sovereigns only will take actions that maintain a
sense of security in society so that no subject can suspect justly that the
sovereign no longer will oblige other subjects to maintain their cove-
nants. This is merely an action for survival.
II. THE STATE OF UNSTABLE SECURITY AND THE (PRELIMINARY)
FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
A. In What Type of State Do Commonwealths Exist as to Each Other?
1. The Possibility of International Agreement in the State of Nature
Hobbes's description of the state of nature is a state where life is
"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."" 3 Intuitively, this does not
seem to describe the current situation between states today. After all,
states already have international agreements among one another,
showing that while not ceding sovereign authority, they do engage in
arms-length relationships that do not exist in the Hobbesian state of
nature.
Both Gauthier and Warrender deal with this issue.'1 4 The impor-
tant passage in the Hobbesian text is as follows:
Nature hath made men so equal.., that.., when all is reckoned to-
' See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting that the sovereign can be
viewed as a third-party beneficiary to a third-party social contract).
112 Since a sovereign was created, Germany's suspicion is reasonable only to the
extent it is true.
113 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiii, para. 9. I will refer to this state as the "Hob-
besian SPNBS state of nature."
114 See GAUTHIER, supra note 64, app. at 207-12 ("Hobbes recognizes that the state
of nations is more tolerable than the condition of individual men in mere nature.");
WARRENDER, supra note 65, at 118-120 ("[States'] position in the past, at least, has not
corresponded exactly with that of Hobbes's individuals in the State of Nature.").
2031
2032 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:2011
gether the difference between man and man is not so considerable as
that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which an-
other may not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the
weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
machination, or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger
with himself.
And as to the faculties of the mind ... I find yet a greater equality
amongst men than that of strength. 15
The problem that both Gauthier and Warrender point out is that
the equality that Hobbes describes in the Hobbesian SPNBS state of
nature does not seem to exist when civil societies have been formed." 6
Nevertheless, both argue that this time of inequality may be ending,
Gauthier specifically pointing to the increase in nuclear armament.Y
I argue that this time is already at an end, if it ever existed at all. Fur-
ther, I believe Gauthier and Warrender are wrong to concentrate on
military power.
While Leviathan concentrates on military threats, " " it must be read
as a document that may apply in the twenty-first century as well as the
seventeenth. We live in a world different from the world that Hobbes
knew in the seventeenth century. As I previously noted, the main
characteristic of the state of nature is insecurity, not battle." 9 Hobbes
was greatly influenced by the Thirty Years' War and the English Civil
War."o Economic, environmental, and cultural insecurity would pale
115 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiii, paras. 1-2.
116 See GAUTHIER, supra note 64, app. at 207 (describing the "state of nations" as
"lack[ing] the fundamental equality Hobbes finds in the State of Nature.");
WARRENDER, supra note 65, at 198 (contrasting the unequal power of states with the
equal ower of individuals).
lpSee GAUTHIER, supra note 64, app. at 207 ("The advent of nuclear weapons is,
however, bringing the state of nations nearer to the true Hobbesian State of Nature.").
118 Hobbes states:
But though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in
a condition of war one against another, yet in all times kings and persons of
sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealous-
ies and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing,
and their eyes fixed on one another, that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns
upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neigh-
bours, which is a posture of war.
HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiii, para. 12.
19 Supra note 62 and accompanying text.
120 See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?,
143 U. PA. L. REv. 1889, 1933 (1995) (positing that Hobbes's experience during the
Thirty Years' War "undoubtedly... left its mark on the theory of sovereignty in the Le-
viathan."); Rudy Wiebe, Land, Language, and Law, 63 SASK. L. REv. 29, 30-31 (2000)
(noting that "Hobbes's thinking was strongly affected by the social chaos created by
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in comparison to militaristic insecurity in his time.
In the twenty-first century, insecurity includes economic, envi-
ronmental, media, and cultural insecurity, among others. The Hob-
besian text may be and must be read to account for this. If an OPEC
nation decided to suspend oil production, the United Kingdom might
spin into a deep recession. If a large industrial country did not put
caps on the production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the entire
world may become uninhabitable for humans. One may think of any
number of possibilities, and the insecurity conjured up by these ex-
amples are twenty-first-century substitutes for the militaristic insecurity
of the seventeenth century. Based on these insecurities, a country the
size and strength of Afghanistan, Oman, or Israel can create extremely
threatening situations for powerful countries like China, Russia, or the
United States. The current state of relations between states includes
the equality and accompanying ability to harm as required to fall
within a Hobbesian state of nature.1
2 ' Although not obvious at first,
this shows that Hobbes's state of nature can allow for the international
agreement that exists today. As proponents of the auto-limitation
theory describe all treaties, many of these agreements are "mere dec-
larations of ... proposed future conduct," for there is no sovereign
with the power to enforce them.
22
2. The State of Unstable Stability
As discussed above, obligation may exist in the state of nature, al-
though in an extremely limited form.
2 3 Given this, one can describe
the state of nature based upon how readily entities within it come to
believe that others will not fulfill their covenant. As such, one can
conceive of a "utopian" state of nature in which individual entities
never believe that others will breach their covenants, and therefore no
sword is necessary. While purely theoretical, this "utopia"'
4 consti-
tutes an extreme against which to contrast the Hobbesian SPNBS state
the English Civil War"); see also PLAMENATZ, supra note 15, at 116 (describing Hobbes's
time as a time of "civil strife and war").
12 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (describing the equality (and related
ability to harm) requisite to enter into the Hobbesian state of nature).
HART, supra note 10, at 224.
123 See supra notes 94-106 and accompanying text (showing that obligation exists in
the state of nature and explaining its fragility in such a state).
124 I use the term "utopia" simply as a name for a fictional state of nature where
covenants can be enforced without a sovereign. I do not use it in any philosophical
sense.
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of nature, or a state in which entities never believe others will fulfill
their covenants. 125 Just to the right of the Hobbesian SPNBS state of
nature and to the left of "utopia" in Figure 1, there exists a state that
can be labeled an "unstable stability." This state can be characterized
as one in which covenants may be invalidated based upon a belief that
another covenanting party may not fulfill its obligation, yet one where
this belief is not a foregone conclusion-a state where entities try to
avoid that belief altogether.
Figure 1: Variances of the State of Nature
State of Unstable Stability (Default position for commonwealths)
t Utopian State of
Hobbesian SPNBS LAWS OF Nature (No soy-
State of Nature NATURE APPLY ereign necessary
on any level)
This state of unstable stability is fully compatible with Hobbes's
theory, though more plausible on an international level than an indi-
vidual level.126 It may be that at some point127 states come to realize
that the insecurity is overwhelming and an international sovereign
power is needed. The municipal sovereigns then would be moving
from a state of unstable stability to a state of nature, and would form a
new international sovereign.
125 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiii, para. 9.
126 Gauthier suggests that the Cold War might be the most pronounced example
of this. See GAUTHIER, supra note 64, app. at 207 ("Hobbes would have approved our
phrase cold war, it expresses well what he took to be the permanent relationship of na-
tions. Hobbes recognizes that the state of nations is more tolerable than the condition
of individual men in mere nature.").
127 In the case of the European Union, this point was World War II. Grossman
and Bradlow see World War II as the impetus for many international organizations.
The Second World War provided members of the international community
with a powerful and tragic lesson in the dangers inherent in an international
legal order based upon a notion of absolute sovereignty. The contemporary
international order severely limited the ability of the international community
to intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states. This lesson provided
the impetus for the creation of new international organizations. The new or-
ganizations were still organized around the principle of sovereignty, but they
were given some ability to compel member states to comply with their rules
and decisions.
Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 13, at 2.
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Since the utopian state, the state of unstable stability, and the
Hobbesian SPNBS state of nature are all variants of the state of nature,
the laws of nature would apply in all cases. Thus, we may proceed to
consider when and how states are required to enter into international
agreements ceding their authority.
B. The Fundamental Law of International Relations
Hobbes, speaking of the end of commonwealths, writes:
The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as
long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to pro-
tect them .... The end of obedience is protection, which, wheresoever a
man seeth it, either in his own or in another's sword, nature applieth his
obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintain it. And though sover-
eignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortal, yet is it in its
own nature, not only subject to violent death by foreign war, but also
through the ignorance and passions of men it hath in it, from the very
institution, many seeds of a natural mortality by intestine discord.
128
Thus, for their own survival, commonwealths must do all they can to
preserve a sense of security within their own borders. Since the Laws
of Nature dictate that one must do what is necessary for one's own
survival,12 9 this is a requirement of that law. Given this premise, con-
sider the second law of nature:
[T] hat a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as for peace
and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right
to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men,
as he would allow other men against 
himself.13
0
Combining this fundamental law with the above premise produces a
preliminary version of what I term the Fundamental Law of Interna-
tional Relations:
When a municipal sovereign sees that its commonwealth is tending toward the
Hobbesian SPNBS state of nature from the state of unstable stability with respect to
other states, so long as the municipal sovereign deems necessary, and so long as
other sovereigns are willing to do so, it must lay down its own sovereignty to create
an international sovereign.
128 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xxi, para. 21 (emphasis added).
1 See HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiv, para. 3 ("A law of nature is a... general
rule... by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life .... ."); see
also WARRENDER, supra note 65, at 48-79 (discussing the laws of nature); supra note 65
and accompanying text (discussing the laws of nature).
130 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xiv, para. 5.
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This "Fundamental Law of International Relations" dictates when a
sovereign must cede a portion of its authority. It does not dictate
when a sovereign cannot cede a portion of its own authority. In fact,
so long as the initial covenant did not place any limitations on the
municipal sovereigns' ability to covenant away their authority, ' mu-
nicipal sovereigns may cede their authority at any time. Thus, even
if states are firmly within the state of unstable stability, they may cede
portions of their authority.
To explain, let us return to another hypothetical three-country
Europe. Suppose Luxembourg has been the dominant power in a
Europe containing Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
Luxembourg has built up a nuclear arsenal capable of destroying the
other two commonwealths within seconds. Throughout their history,
however, all three commonwealths have entered into treaties to pro-
mote military cooperation among them. Yet, in recent years, the
Netherlands has been building up its subversive capabilities and now
possesses a credible threat to both Belgium and Luxembourg. In
turn, Belgium has built up a nuclear arsenal. The commonwealths no
longer trust each other and are tending toward the state of nature.
There is often bloodshed and battle between the powers, and it seems
the war is at a stalemate. Since the commonwealths are all under a
duty to seek peace whenever possible, 3 3 they have all tried disposable
means of doing so, but there is a general consensus that only a com-
mon sovereign could stabilize the situation. So long as each of the
134other commonwealths is willing to do so, each commonwealth is
under a duty, in foro interno, 3 5 to create an international sovereign.
131 See infra Part III.E (discussing this corollary to the Fundamental Law of Interna-
tional Relations).
132 See supra Part I.B (explaining how sovereign authority may be limited); infra
notes 158-66 and accompanying text (showing how an initial covenant may limit the
sovereign's ability to covenant away its own authority).
S33 ee supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text (explaining that the laws of nature
oblige humans to seek peace whenever possible and that municipal sovereigns are sub-
ject to the laws of nature).
134 If any of the commonwealths are not willing, then there would be no covenant.
35 The laws of nature only bind in foro interno. See supra note 99 for a discussion
of obligations in foro interno.
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Figure 2: When the Fundamental Law of
International Relations Applies
Sovereigns PERMITTED to enter into an international covenant




enter into an international Utopian
covenant State of Na-
f ture (No
sovereign
Hobbesian SMNBS A LAWS OF NATURE necessary on
State of Nature APPLY ofany level)
Considering the potential limitation of the sovereign's scope of
power, 16the municipal commonwealths may move into an interna-
tional commonwealth as to pollution, for example, while maintaining
a state of unstable stability regarding defense. For example, the
commonwealths of the world may realize that each country poses an
extreme risk with regard o tehe production of CFCs, and feel the need
for an international sovereign, while still feeling they can negotiate
with each other on an economic or militaristic level.
III. OBJECTIONS TO THE THESIS AND COROLLARIES TO THE
FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
A. The Indivisibility of Sovereign Right 
37
After finishing his discussion of the fights of the sovereign, Hob-
( 3 See supra Part B (discussing the feasibility of creating a sovereign of limited
powers).
137 As has been shown, Hobbes's terminology and the terminology of Hohfeld do
not match immediately. Hobbes's term "right" can be analogized to Hohfeld's term
tprivilege." See supa notes 52-61 (reviewing Hohfeld's rights analysis and comparing it
with Hobbes's state of nature). Further, when Hobbes speaks of sovereign rights, we
can assume him to mean privileges of the sovereign that match up with privileges laid
down by the subjects, hence sovereign powers. See GAUTHIER, supra note 64, at 126-28
(explaining the meaning of sovereign right within the Hobbesian text). For the sake
of simplicity, I will use the term "right" in this section, as this is what Hobbes uses in his
text.
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bes speaks of those rights as indivisible:
These are the fights which make the essence of sovereignty... [and]
are incommunicable and inseparable. The power to coin money, to dis-
pose of the estate and persons of infant heirs, to have preemption in
markets, and all other statute prerogatives may be transferred by the sov-
ereign, and yet the power to protect his subjects be retained. But if he
transfer the militia, he retains the judicature in vain, for want of execu-
tion of the laws; or if he grant away the power of raising money, the mili-
tia is in vain; or if he give away the government of doctrines, men will be
frighted into rebellion with the fear of spirits. And so if we consider any
one of the said rights, we shall presently see, that the holding of all the
rest will produce no effect, in the conservation of peace and justice, the
end for which all commonwealths are instituted. And this division is it,
whereof it is said a kingdom divided in itself cannot stand.1
8
This suggests that the powers cannot be divided. Hobbes considers
the division of sovereign power as a contribution to the dissolution of
the commonwealth: "There is a sixth doctrine plainly and directly
against the essence of a commonwealth, and it is this: That the sover-
eign power may be divided. For what is it to divide the power of a com-
monwealth, but to dissolve it; for powers divided mutually destroy
each other.",39  To address this, we may look once again to the
Hohfeldian terms and to our three-country Europe. The sovereign
governments of Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands' 40 have
just covenanted with each other to create the European Union, which
will have powers over the economic policy between the three com-
monwealths. We know that if Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Nether-
lands were individuals, this creation would be valid. Belgium would
have a duty to Luxembourg and the Netherlands to obey the Euro-
pean Union, but only as to that power given to it. Within that area,
the European Union would be sovereign. The question is, in entering
into this covenant, are Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands
invalidly dividing their sovereign powers?
Hobbes says of those who create the covenants: "[E]very subject is
by this institution author of all the actions and judgments of the sov-
ereign instituted.'' 4 Thus, even if the Netherlands were to covenant
with Belgium and Luxembourg, it would create a sovereign of whose
138 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xviii, para. 16.
Id. at ch. xxix, para. 12.
140 Similar to the previous European Union example, although I am referring to
the sovereigns of each government, I will drop the term "the sovereign of" for linguis-
tic simplicity.
141 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xviii, para. 6.
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acts it itself is an author. To its subjects, this new sovereign is the same
thing as the Netherlands itself. For when the sovereign acts, the
Netherlands acts as well. Hobbes's statement concerning the invalid-
ity of dividing rights only concerns giving up one's rights without cre-
ating a sovereign whose exercise of those rights would be one's own.
While, in one of the subheadings of chapter eighteen, Hobbes writes,
"The Consequences to such Institution are I. The Subjects cannot
change the form of government,"14' nowhere in the book does he
mention an inability of the sovereign to change the form of govern-
ment. From this explicit statement that the subjects may not change
the form of government and the conspicuous absence of any mention
of the sovereign changing the form of government, one may conclude
that Hobbes meant to allow the sovereign to change the form of gov-
ernment. In creating a new sovereign and vesting some sovereign
rights in the new sovereign, the old sovereign is merely changing the
form of its government. Further argument can be made from the fol-
lowing passage: "If a monarch shall relinquish the sovereignty, both
for himself and his heirs, his subjects return to the absolute liberty of
nature .... For then there can no heir be known, and consequently
no subjection be due."143 In the case of international law, a sovereign
has not relinquished its sovereignty over its subjects. It has just created
a new form of enforcement. Since the sovereign power still exists, the
subjects cannot have a reasonable fear that the sovereign will not be
able to protect them, and thus their covenants with each other to obey
the sovereign remain intact.
B. The Theory That Power Must Emanate from the People
Another argument may be similar to the one presented to the
German court by challenging the European Union Treaty in the
Maastricht case. 144 Before Germany ratified the Treaty of Maastricht,1
4
1
twenty separate constitutional challenges were filed. 146 The basic ra-
tionale of the complaints was that approval of the treaty would violate
142 Id. at ch. xviii, paras. 2-3 (emphasis added).
143 Id. at ch. xxi, para. 23.
144 Brunner v. European Union Treaty, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 72 (BVerfGE 1993)
(F.R.G.) (noting the argument that an individual's "right to participate in the exercise
of state power" is "substantially diminished because the Union Treaty 'transfers' essen-
tial competences of the Bundestag to institutions of the European Communities").
145 This treaty, which established the European Union in its current three-pillar
form, is the TEU TREATY, supra note 19.
146 BERMANN ETAL., SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, at 123.
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the German constitutional principle 47 that "all state power emanates
from the people."48 The idea, set forth in Hohfeldian terms, is that if
the subjects covenanted together to create powers in a specific sover-
eign, the sovereign would violate the original covenant if it vested
those powers in someone else. In other words, the subjects had cove-
nanted with one another to obey sovereign X. Intuitively, it does not
seem right that they should be obligated to obey anyone other than
sovereign X.
The answer to this objection, which comes not from the text, but
from principle, is quite similar to the above answer-that the power is
still emanating from the people. The sovereign was not a party to the
original covenant; the people were the only parties to the covenant,
and all they agreed to do was obey the sovereign. Suppose that after
Belgium covenants with the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the Euro-
pean Union creates a court whose jurisdiction includes all the subjects
in the commonwealths of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg in antitrust cases. Though the citizens now are subject directly
to this new court, in Hobbesian terms they are really subject to the ini-
tial sovereign's power. Again:
[Blecause every subject is by this institution author of all the actions and
judgments of the sovereign instituted, it follows that, whatsoever he
doth, it can be no injury to any of his subjects, nor ought he to be by any
of them accused of injustice .... [B]y this institution of a commonwealth
every particular man is author of all the sovereign doth ....149
Thus, no matter what this new court does, the Netherlands may
not claim that the new court's actions are not its own. As such, the
subjects of the Netherlands are in theory still subject to the sovereign,
though in a new setting. The rights of the sovereign were not divided
or even taken away from it-they were just recast in a new light. Since
the Netherlands' power stems from the subjects of the commonwealth
of the Netherlands and the European Union's power stems from the
147 Article 38 of the German Basic Law provides that elected legislative officials
"shall be representatives of the whole people." DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, app. at 512
(2d ed. 1997); see also Brunner, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. at 72 (interpreting the claim as the
"right to participate in the exercise of state power").
148 BERMANN ET AL., SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, at 123. The German court "re-
served... the right to verify whether and to what extent the institutions may have ex-
ceeded powers accorded them," and concluded that "the European Union lacks the
power to define finally its own powers and competences or to require German authori-
ties to implement them if the Constitutional Court rules otherwise." Id. at 124.
149 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xviii, para. 6.
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sovereign of the Netherlands, the base of power is still the subjects of
the commonwealth of the Netherlands.
One may object and say that if the subjects are now going to be
subjects of a new sovereign, they should approve of the new sovereign
by way of a referendum. After all, the legal status of the subjects is
changing, as they are now liable to a new sovereign. Remember, how-
ever, that at the creation of the commonwealth, the subjects created a
sovereign with certain powers, or the ability to change its subject's le-
gal status. All that a sovereign does by entering into this international
covenant is change the legal status of its subjects. Providing the sub-
jects enabled the sovereign to engage in this type of international
treaty, the sovereign is well within its powers to take this action.
One caveat becomes clear from this argument. The sovereign
may not cede more authority than it was provided originally under the
subjects' covenants between each other. I have been arguing that
even if the sovereign cedes its authority to a new sovereign, the sub-
jects are still obeying the original sovereign so that the new sovereign's
power still emanates from the people. This argument falls apart if the
new sovereign has powers and privileges not granted to the original
sovereign. Thus, if the sovereign's powers in Belgium were limited to
regulating economic activities, it may not covenant to create a new
sovereign whose powers and privileges include regulating the criminal
law system. This holds true even if those with whom it is covenanting
have powers and privileges to regulate the criminal law system in their
own commonwealth. In other words, the scope of power of an inter-
national sovereign may only be as wide as the scope of power of the
weakest sovereign that created it. Therefore, we get an amended
Fundamental Law of International Relations:
When a municipal sovereign sees that its commonwealth is tending toward the
Hobbesian SPNBS state of nature from the state of unstable stability with respect to
other states, so long as the municipal sovereign deems necessary, and so long as
other sovereigns are willing to do so, it must lay down its own sovereignty to create
an international sovereign whose powers will not exceed the powers granted the
municipal sovereign by its subjects.
C. The Specific Problem of a Defeated Sovereign
One challenging the validity of international law may use yet an-
other passage to support his argument: "If a monarch subdued by war
render himself subject to the victor, his subjects are delivered from
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their former obligation, and become obliged to the victor."5 ° This
passage appears in Leviathan under the heading "In case the Sover-
eign render himself Subject to another."5 ' As stated above, 52 the state
of war does not necessarily apply to actual battle, but can apply to any
state of insecurity. One may claim, then, that if the sovereign believes
that the only way to maintain peace is to create an international sover-
eign, the sovereign is subjecting itself to another and its subjects are
no longer obliged to obey it.
However, this passage mentions the word "victor," and from that,
one may conclude that whatever war there was, be it an actual battle,
or a war of culture, language, etc., one side came out clearly above
another. If the battle has come this far, however, the subjects of the
sovereign already have been relieved of their duty toward each other
to obey the sovereign and are thus back in the Hobbesian SPNBS state
of nature as to each other.55 If Belgium is in battle with Luxembourg
and Belgium is about to be defeated, it ceases to exist. By its inability
to defend its subjects, Belgium has allowed for them reasonably to be-
lieve that the other subjects no longer will obey the original covenant.
This represents a relinquishing of Belgium's power over its subjects so
that Hobbes's passage regarding the relinquishing of sovereign power
now applies.154 The subjects of the defeated sovereign are no longer
subject to the defeated sovereign and have returned to the Hobbesian
SBNBS state of nature and Hobbes's passage regarding common-
Id. at ch. xxi, para. 25.
151 Id.
:52 Supra note 62 and accompanying text.
53 Realistically, this return to the Hobbesian SPNBS state of nature would be quite
brief. As per Hobbes's passage on commonwealth by acquisition, the victorious sover-
eign would covenant with each of the defeated sovereign's subjects and they would be-
come subjects of it. He states:
A commonwealth by acquisition is that where the sovereign power is acquired
by force; and it is acquired by force when men singly (or many together by
plurality of voices) for fear of death or bonds to authorize all the actions of
that man or assembly that hath their lives and liberty in his power.
And this kind of dominion or sovereignty differeth from sovereignty by in-
stitution only in this, that men who choose their sovereign do it for fear of one
another, and not of him whom they institute, but in this case they subject
themselves to him they are afraid of. In both cases they do it for fear ....
It is not. . . victory that giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished,
but his own covenant.
HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xx, paras. 1-2, 11.
154 See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text (setting out the ends of sovereign
power).
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wealth by acquisition takes precedence.
Thus, the challenge is superficial; states that are tending toward
the Hobbesian SPNBS state of nature still have the ability to create an
international sovereign. However, the challenge adds a second corol-
lary to the Fundamental Law of International Relations-a corollary
that refines its applicability. It shows that this law can operate only
where there are municipal sovereigns, and thus there can be no inter-
national law once states fall back into the Hobbesian SPNBS state of
nature. Figure 3 reflects this concrete boundary.
Figure 3: When the Fundamental Law of International Relations
Applies (Revised) and When Valid International Law
May Not Be Created
Sovereigns PERMITTED to enter into an international covenant
INENTOA AUEAPYSovereignncs
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D. That the Sovereign Cannot Be Subject to the Civil Laws
I have been arguing that the municipal sovereign is the author of
any newly created international sovereign's acts, so that the acts of th e
newly created international sovereign are also the acts of the original
municipal sovereign. However, Hobbes states:
A fourth opinion repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth is this:
That he that hath the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws. It is true that
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sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature .... But to those laws
which the sovereign himself, that is, which the commonwealth maketh,
he is not subject. For to be subject to laws is to be subject to the com-
monwealth, that is, to the sovereign representative, that is, to himself,
which is not subjection, but freedom from the laws. Which error, be-
cause it setteth the laws above the sovereign, setteth also a judge above
him, and a power to punish him, which is to make a new sovereign; and
again for the same reason a third, to punish the second; and so continu-
ally without end, to the confusion and dissolution of the common-
wealth.
By allowing the sovereign to give up some of its sovereignty, are we not
allowing it to create more and more sovereigns without end? And if
so, does this not tend toward confusion, as Hobbes said?"6
To answer this challenge, I return to our hypothetical pre-Union
Europe. Belgium has just covenanted with the Netherlands and Lux-
embourg to enter into a limited European Union, which will have the
power only to deal with pollution. Belgium has passed a statute allow-
ing a pollution level of 0.005 ppm in the air. The European Union
has issued a directive 57 to the Member States not to allow a pollution
level of greater than 0.002 ppm. This, however, is not the confusion-
causing situation of which Hobbes speaks.
Hobbes's theory objects to subjecting the sovereign of common-
wealth X to the civil laws of commonwealth X, not with subjecting the
sovereign of commonwealth X to the civil laws of newly created com-
monwealth XYZ. Looking at this European Union, Belgium has un-
dertaken an obligation to obey the international sovereign and, as
such, must obey the Union's rules regarding pollution. It is clear that
the European Union directive supersedes the law of Belgium. There
is no confusion. The confusion Hobbes speaks of would exist only if
Belgium were to be judged by one of its own subjects as to whether it
is complying with its own laws. Here, Belgium's compliance with the
155 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xxix, para. 9.
156 There must be an answer to this objection for Hobbes's theory of municipal
sovereignty to work. For in the state of nature, each individual can be defined as its
own unique mini-sovereign entity. By entering into the initial covenant and authoring
the acts of a municipal sovereign, each individual "mini-sovereign" would be subjecting
itself to its own civil laws. It would seem as if Hobbes would deny the value of his own
theoy by accepting this interpretation of his text.
17 A directive within the European Union legal structure is a piece of legislation
passed by the European Union that is binding as to the result to be achieved, but
leaves to the national authorities the choice of how to implement legislation to achieve
the results. See EC TREATY, supra note 37, at art. 249 (describing the various forms of
legislating within the European Union); see also BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 4, at 75 (differentiating directives from regulations).
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European Union laws is judged by one of the European Union's sub-
jects, who also may be a subject of Belgium, but in a different role.
In response, one may throw my argument back at me. Have I not
just stated that the international sovereign's actions are the actions of
the municipal sovereigns? I answer that civil international law is not
the type of law that Hobbes was alluding to in his passage. Rather,
Hobbes was alluding strictly to subjecting the civil sovereign to civil
municipal law. Let us take a hypothetical household in Belgium, the
Cooke household. Mrs. Cooke is known as the rulemaker in her
household. She decides when to have dinner, what can be viewed on
the television, etc. Hobbes argued that she should not be held to her
own rules. For if Mrs. Cooke were subject to her own laws, who would
judge her? If her rule was that no one was to eat spaghetti that she
considered too al dente in her household, only she could be the judge
of that. However, Mrs. Cooke should be subject to the municipal sov-
ereign's rules, even though they are partly her own. Being subject to
the sovereign's laws, while they are authored by her as well, provides
an efficient system by which her actions may be judged.
Returning to the European Union, if Belgium had a law stating
that pollution levels could not rise above that level which the Belgian
sovereign deemed reasonable, then only the Belgian sovereign could
be the judge of reasonableness. However, if an international law su-
persedes the Belgian law, Belgium is no longer required to be the
judge of reasonableness, and now has a separate, efficient system by
which reasonableness of pollution will be judged.
E. Limiting the Power of the Sovereign to Enter into
an International Legal Structure
Earlier in this Comment, I spoke of the subjects' ability to limit
the power they give to their own sovereign. 5 This must allow for the
possibility that the subjects may limit the sovereign's power to enter
into an international agreement.
For subjects to limit the ability of a sovereign to enter into a treaty
that limits sovereignty, the subjects' covenants with each other must
consist of some variation of "I, Jon, agree that I will take upon a duty
toward you, Gary, that I will obey Germany, which shall have unlim-
ited power over me and unlimited privileges, with the exception that
it not have the power to cede any of its sovereignty. If it does attempt
158 Supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
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to cede its sovereignty, my duty toward you is dissolved, as is the com-
monwealth itself." Another variation may call for Germany to have a
referendum if it wants to cede sovereignty. It would read, "I, Jon,
agree that I will take upon a duty toward you, Gary, that I will obey
Germany, who shall have unlimited power over me and unlimited
privileges. However, I do not agree to give it the power to cede any of
its sovereignty without consulting all of its subjects in the form of a
referendum. If it attempts to do so, my duty to obey is dissolved."
This does not subject Germany to civil municipal law,' 59 and Germany
is free to organize the referendum in any way it pleases. It does, how-
ever, limit Germany's ability to cede its sovereignty.
These types of covenants exist today. For example, article 54 of
the constitution of the French Republic reads:
If the Constitutional Council, when consulted by the President of the
Republic, the Prime Minister, or the president of one of the houses of
Parliament, declares that an international treaty or agreement contains a
clause contrary to the Constitution, the Constitution must be revised be-
fore the treaty or agreement can be ratified or approved."1°
Thus, if the Constitutional Council ruled that an international
treaty in which France ceded a portion of its sovereign rights to an-
other sovereign violated the French constitution, the constitution
would have to be revised before the treaty could be approved. How-
ever, article 92 of the Dutch constitution permits the transfer by treaty
of legislative, executive, and judicial powers to international institu-
tions."" Similarly, article 24 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic
of Germany explicitly states: "The Federation may by legislation trans-
fer sovereign powers to inter-governmental institutions. , 162 While the
U.S. Constitution does not speak directly to the cessation of sover-
eignty, it does set out a procedure by which the sovereign may create
international treaties.
63
Whether or not parties to a Hobbesian contract will think in ad-
vance to limit the sovereign's power with respect to international
agreements is an uncertain question. It would seem that to Hobbes,
159 See supra Part II.D (discussing the problems of subjecting a sovereign to its own
civil municipal law).
160 FR. CONST. (Constitution of the French Republic) art. 54.
161 NETH. CONST. (Dutch Constitution of the Netherlands) art. 92.
162 F.R.G. CONST. (Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany) art. 24, § 1.
163 "[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur ......
U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.
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whose time was one of "civil strife and war,"1'' the only goal at the time
of the original covenant was an absolute sovereign. Indeed, Hobbes
seems to have a preference for absolute sovereignty:
So that is appeareth plainly ... that the sovereign power (whether
placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly of men, as in
popular and aristocratical commonwealths) is as great as possibly men
can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a power men
may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of
it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, are much
165
worse.
It does seem that after a period of such war, humans would want
the strongest sovereign imaginable. It is possible, however, to con-
ceive of a different situation in which entities may create a new civil
society after a long period of despair under a despot, and thus would
be suspicious of another absolute sovereign'.'l Hobbes seems to be
speaking merely from his own experience in making the above state-
ment. One can imagine many reasons why entities would limit the
power of their sovereign.
Whether or not the entities creating a sovereign are inclined to
create limitations on the sovereign authority, a third corollary to the
Fundamental Law of International Relations is required. That is, be-
fore one may accept the ceding of sovereignty as instantly valid, one
must examine the original covenant that created the commonwealth
to see whether the sovereign was given the power to cede its authority.
Thus, the final version of the Fundamental Law of International Rela-
tions reads:
When a municipal sovereign sees that its commonwealth is tending toward the
Hobbesian SPNBS state of nature from the state of unstable stability with respect to
other states, so long as the municipal sovereign deems necessary, so long as the
sovereign has the power to do so, and so long as other sovereigns are willing to do
so, it must lay down its own sovereignty to create an international sovereign whose
powers will not exceed the powers granted the municipal sovereign by its subjects.
Thus, auto-limitation remains, but not in an implicit form. It must be
expressed in the original covenant.
164 PLAMENATZ, supra note 15, at 116.
165 HOBBES, supra note 50, at ch. xx, para. 18; see also supra note 74 (commenting
on Hobbes's preference for an absolute sovereign).
1W66 For a discussion of how humans deliberate and might come to the conclusion
that an absolute sovereign is less secure than a limited one, see HOBBES, supra note 50,
at chs. i-vii.
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CONCLUSION
I have shown that, at times, the laws of nature oblige a municipal
sovereign to cede its sovereignty and formulate an international sov-
ereign. Accordingly, one advocating the auto-limitation theory must
reconcile that belief with the fact that he is arguing against the laws of
nature. Thus, sovereigns may take upon themselves legal obligations.
Returning to Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd.
v. Grogan,'67 assume that the Council of the European Union has is-
sued a directive requiring Member States, even those who outlaw
abortion, to allow the distribution of pamphlets indicating where their
residents could go to receive a legal abortion. Further assume that
the time for implementation of this directive has passed, and the di-
rective now applies to members of each state through the "direct ef-
fects" doctrine. 16 Further assume that this directive is compatible with
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and is in accord
with the European Convention on Human Rights. Finally, assume
that Ireland maintains its injunction against the students.
Since Ireland's powers were not limited expressly in its constitu-
tion, and the European Union does not have any more powers than
were initially granted the Irish government, the directive must prevail.
Ireland was permitted to enter into the agreement creating the Euro-
pean Union, which is an international legal structure. It has a duty
toward the other Member States to obey the law of the new legal struc-
ture.
It is as important to note what I am not claiming here as much as
what I am claiming. I am not claiming that all treaty obligations are
initially valid. I am merely claiming that some may be so. The frame-
work in which the issue of the validity of international law must be ad-
dressed is whether countries adhering to this law in fact ceded their
authority. A treaty that does not set up an international legal sover-
eign is what proponents of the auto-limitation theory think all treaties
are: statements of future intentions. However, once it has been de-
termined that the treaty not only stated intended future acts, but ac-
tually ceded some authority (as in the European Union), the laws
167 [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 689 (Ir. S.C. 1989).
168 A directive is binding only as to the Member States and not their residents. See
supra note 157 (describing the legal effect of a directive). However, once the time
limit given to implement the directive has expired, the directive may be said to be "di-
rectly applicable" to the citizens of each Member State. Case 41/74, van Duyn v.
Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337, 1346, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 1 (1974).
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passed by the new international sovereign are valid international law.
Laws created by a properly instituted international sovereign are
properly called laws. The hypothetical cases discussed in Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft and Society for the Protection of Unborn Children have
already been decided. The European Union law prevails and the
Member States have a duty to obey.
* * * * * *
